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Abstract Since the ’90s, China’s economic power has grown massively, and with it the authorities’ 
desire to control and craft its global image. Yet, despite policed Internet and surveillance of its citi-
zens, contestation of the authorities’ control has come from social, ecological and cultural activists. 
Since the start of the century, China has staged the Olympics, had a Chinese woman win the Miss 
World competition, and claims to wage a ‘war on terror’. A spectacle of a peaceful, harmonious and 
‘normal’ country – a ‘China dream’ – is projected. This article seeks to apprehend the reality behind 
the dream and to show how China's current condition is the result of a historical domination by, but 
also voluntary engagement with, the ‘West’.
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Whatever the future evolution of China, it is certain that it will 
totally destabilize the existing fragile world disorder.
Cornelius Castoriadis, June 19951 
Since the turn of this century, China’s economic power has grown mas-
sively, and with it the desire to control and craft its cultural image abroad. 
This has even given rise to a cultural diplomatic offensive to displace long-
standing foreign discourses on and about China with a cultural imaginary 
and a historical narrative generated by the Chinese authorities themselves. 
The imposition of an official narrative of history, and thus of the present 
and the future, has been achieved internally by an increasingly policed 
Internet – witness the recent closing-down of celebrated dissident micro-
1 Castoriadis 2013: ‘Quelle que soit l’évolution à venir de la Chine, il est certain qu’elle 
déstabilisera complètement le fragile désordre mondial existant”. All translations are by 
the Author.
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bloggers’ Weibo accounts – and by close surveillance of cultural activities, 
and abroad by China’s soft power cultural diplomacy initiatives via its 
network of Confucius Institutes. 
But what constitutes the nature of the reality that is China, a reality that 
cultural diplomacy seeks to mask? The China of the twenty-first century 
has integrated the technic-economic world, indeed China is also respon-
sible for shaping this ‘disorder’, as Castoriadis has it. This article seeks 
to apprehend the reality behind the dream and to demonstrate how the 
current condition of China is the result of a historical domination by, but 
also voluntary engagement with, the ‘West’.
*
Since the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989 – now out of living memory for 
some forty per cent of the population – China’s authorities have vigor-
ously advanced the country’s integration into the world technic-economic 
system, gaining membership of the world’s major organisations of eco-
nomic and political power, modernizing the military, preparing to put a 
person on the moon, and claiming to be engaged in the ‘war on terror’. 
Yet despite these aspirations to global ‘normality’, the government has 
not yet managed to control and suppress dissent and despite all its efforts 
the Chinese culture that the world most appreciates is not that which is 
promoted and sponsored by the state, but that which is unofficial and 
fractious. 
In 2014, the central authorities condemned to long prison sentences a 
number of academics, the most well-known of whom is the Chinese Ui-
ghur economist Ilham Tohti. In the same year, the people of Hong Kong 
demonstrated massively their unwillingness to accept an undemocratic 
future in what became known as the Umbrella Movement. In 2015, a 
campaign was launched against ‘Western’ values and the use of ‘West-
ern’ textbooks in universities. Its recent – between October 2015 and 
the time of writing – manœuvres to stifle external dissenting voices (the 
‘abductions’ and the subsequent televised confessions of five Hongkong 
bookseller-publishers, the televised confession and expulsion of Swed-
ish national and human rights activist, Peter Dahlin, the traducing and 
expulsion of the French journalist, Ursula Gauthier over an article about 
the CCP’s treatment of Uighurs in Xinjiang) indicate the far from ‘soft-
power’ lengths to which the authorities will go to control the flow of in-
formation in, and about, China, even when such actions are detrimental 
to its global image.
These are the contemporary realities that academics involved in China 
studies in Europe have a duty to contrast against the efforts of China’s 
authorities to project an image of China as peaceful, harmonious and 
‘normal’. But China’s vexed investment in modernity can be traced back 
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to the mid-19th century, and in terms of its modern nation-state incarna-
tion to the second decade of the twentieth century. In 1919, students who 
were contesting the weakness and betrayal of China’s delegation at the 
World War 1 Versailles peace congress, which saw Germany’s colonies 
in China handed over to Japan rather than handed back to China held 
up banners echoing the intellectual and political activist Chen Duxiu’s 
call for Mr. Confucius to be replaced by Mr. Democracy and Mr. Science: 
德謨克拉西先生 demokelaxi xiansheng and 塞恩斯先生 saiensi xiansheng.2
But what exactly had Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀, the originator of the ‘Mr 
Democracy-Mr Science’ slogan, intended by ‘science’? The future, and 
the first, leader of the Chinese Communist Party saw science as the 
positivist cure to ancient obscurantism. For Chen, ‘modern Europe’s su-
periority over other races is due to the rise of science” (近代歐洲之所以優
越他族者，科學之興).3 Ignorant of science, scholars were cast as charlatans 
using geomancy to hoodwink the people; farmers were ignorant of seed 
selection techniques and the use of pesticides; industrialists’ ignorance 
of science was responsible for dependence on foreign countries; physi-
cians were ignorant of anatomy, bacteria and contagion, and depended 
on ancient formulae such as yin and yang. 
The solutions to such deficiencies lay in science: “as for such unknowl-
edgeable thinking, such illogical beliefs, if we wish to cure them at the 
root, we apply science (凡此無常識之思惟，無理由之信仰，欲根治之，厥為科學)”. In 
this denunciation of superstitious practices and old knowledge that was 
constituent of, and that propped up, a conservative regime’s ideology, he 
simultaneously opposes science to the spontaneity and creativity of the 
‘imagination’ that he consigns to a past moment. Indeed the sixth section 
of his ‘Call to Youth’ is entitled ‘Scientific and Not Imaginative’ 科學的而
非想像的. For Chen, imagination is the antithesis of reason:
在昔蒙昧之世，當今淺化之民，有想象而無科學。宗教美文，皆想象時代之產物。
2 Note how the two words were commonly transliterated from English as demokelaxi and 
saiensi. Later ‘democracy’ would be translated with minzhuzhuyi 民主主義 from the Japanese 
minshu 民主, and ‘science’ with kexue 科學 from the Japanese kagaku 科學. However, in Chen 
Duxiu’s 1915 ‘Call to Youth’ (see the note below) the Japanese-derived translation minshu 
民主 was preferred. It is possible that in post-Versailles China when Japan had just been 
handed German’s colonies, it was deemed preferable to avoid Japanese translations. The 
sexism implicit in the figure of the two Misters is striking and unfortunate, for the reality 
was that numerous women students were at the forefront of the Fourth May Movement. In 
fact, in the fight against a patriarchal ideology that not only obliged the young to vener-
ate the old but treated women as almost worthless, women were amongst the most ardent 
agitators. See Dooling 2005, 35.
3 Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀, ‘Jinggao qingnian’ 敬告青年 (literally ‘Warning to Youth’, often trans-
lated as ‘Call to Youth’) (reproduced on People’s Daily website, http://dangshi.people.com.
cn/ BIG5/151935/151936/151965/9123165.html) (2017-10-23).
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In former benighted times there was, and today among uncultured peo-
ples there is, imagination but no science. Religion, art and writing, were 
the product of the era of the imagination.
Imagination, here closely associated with myth and creativity, is assigned 
to the past. There can be no cohabitation between science and imagina-
tion. In his celebrated slogan what Chen would pair with ‘science’ was 
‘democracy’. 
Chen would soon abandon ‘democracy’ in favour of historical material-
ism, but his belief in science that would bring ‘modernisation’ to China 
endured. And yet, it is evident from the catastrophic outcomes of the 
twentieth century that science, beholden to technology, was not the instru-
ment by which democracy, in the sense of liberty and autonomy, would 
be brought about. Witness the state of the industrialised planet, of which 
China is an integral part, today. Science has not been objective, and has 
certainly not been neutral. And democratic control of science and technol-
ogy has not been practised to date. So-called liberal democracies, just as 
totalitarian autocracies, are no longer the drivers of technology, they are 
the driven. The so-called neutrality of science has allowed a head-long and 
limit-less expansion of unnecessary, and certainly ill-considered, technolo-
gies which have not brought about ‘progress’ but rather an ecologically 
doomed environment and socio-economically unequal global society.
*
Since the middle of the nineteenth century, China’s élite had then felt itself 
obliged to re-invent the country as a modern nation-state. The 1919 post-
World War One, Treaty of Versailles and the 4 May Movement to which it 
gave rise, convinced China’s élite of the need to emulate the West as had 
Japan, in order to (re)create China. Or rather to create a modern nation-
state China for the first time. This Western process of nationalisation was 
seen as the means to resist the colonialist system that had just humiliated 
it once again, and to attain sovereignty over what would become a national 
territory. This was an ideology shared with other colonised peoples. Sover-
eignty, it was held, could only be achieved via modernity, and the Versailles 
process had reaffirmed nationalism as the only means to achieve a modern 
organisation of peoples (see Duara 2008, 63).
A classical radical or Marxist reading of the outcome of Versailles would 
hold that it put the imperialist world in a dilemma and spelt its death-knell. 
For if the non-white, non-European world could not benefit, there and 
then, from the Wilsonian doctrine of self-determination, the principle of 
the essential link between nationalism and modernity had been affirmed 
and would sooner or later bring the decline and fall of colonialism (see 
Füredi 1994, 5).
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But this model of nation-state modernity as a means of self-determina-
tion and attainment of sovereignty was a poisoned chalice. Once China 
had accepted the need for Westernisation/modernisation – let us recall that 
the term 西方 xifanghua was in the first half of the twentieth century not 
only synonymous with modernisation it was the ‘natural’ way of referring 
to the process – China’s incorporation into the world system, which has 
been variously called colonialism, Americanisation, globalisation, became 
inevitable.4 Similarly, what this path rendered inevitable was the obliga-
tion to adopt Western epistemologies and to eliminate old pre-nation-state, 
‘Chinese’ knowledge.
Whether or not the Versailles Wilsonian doctrine and the Western impe-
rialist system that gave rise to it did indeed signify that there was never 
any alternative to mimicry of what was then still a Western system is dis-
putable, but what will be demonstrated below is that this system had led 
China and the world into an impasse.
Far from announcing the end of colonialism and its procedures which 
were intimately imbricated in what we call modernity, these same proce-
dures were seen as the panacea. The real success of colonialism at the 
start of the twentieth century, a success that continues to this day, was to 
have convinced colonised peoples, or rather their élites, that there was 
no alternative to the emulation, imitation and mimicry of the nation-state 
paradigm. For the élite what counted was access to the colonial powers’ 
knowledge and science.
In the pursuit of this logic an enormous contradiction was pushed 
aside. In order to regain sovereignty, a power of agency, China’s radi-
cal élite rejected all that was local and heterogeneous, as witnessed 
by Chen Duxiu’s ‘call to Youth’ quoted above. It had to homogenise its 
languages and cultures and customs, and sweep out diversity to in-
stall uniformity.5 In short, it had to imitate, and thus even become this 
Western Other. 
4 Duara sees globalisation as putting the former territorial model of China as nation-state 
under stress: “The effort to integrate the overseas Han Chinese into the nation has led to 
a spatial reimagination of the nation from the territorial China to the ethnic one” (Duara 
2008, 63).
5 One of the first recorded appeals for the use of Guoyu 國語 was made by a group of re-
turned students from Japan in 1906 “to train people to speak the national language in order 
to eliminate the dialects of the provinces”. See “Gesheng liu Hu xuesheng zonghui diyize 
jianzhang 各省留滬學生總會第–則簡章” (First Draft programme of the Alliance of Students in 
Shanghai from All Provinces) (1906) in 江寧 學務 Jiangning xuewu (Educational Affairs of 
Jiangning prefecture) Nanking, 1906, cited in Chow 1960, 34. However, it was not until the 
early ’20s that the national language started to be institutionalised. In January 1920, the 
Ministry of Education decreed that the vernacular be used in the first two years of primary 
education and the adoption of the vernacular quickly spread to higher echelons of the school 
system. In 1920-1, the vernacular was officially recognised as the ‘national language’ or 
Guoyu 國語. See Chow 1960, 279.
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Science and scientism took hold of the élite’s imaginary as it had taken 
hold of the Western popular imaginary in the second half of the nineteenth 
century when “in the name of science it was deemed necessary to destroy 
false ideas, religions, cultural traditions, myths; all that was a product of 
the imagination of the dark ages had absolutely to be replaced by the Light 
of Science”.6 While this logic is still dominant, with all its social, economic, 
and environmental consequences, it now clashes with the authorities at-
tempts to institute a local identitarian cultural politics with which to com-
bat the temptation of democracy.
*
In recently launching a campaign against Western values in the academic 
sphere it is as if the authorities wished to cut off China’s nose to spite its 
face. Where do ‘Western’ values stop and ‘Western’ science start? At stake 
is not only what is projected as Western culture, which we know is now a 
global culture, but what is perceived as Western methodology. Ironically, 
for the past fifty to sixty years humanistic values have been under attack in 
the Western academy itself where humanities scholars have been pushed 
and bullied into reinventing themselves as scientists and into adopting a 
‘scientific’ methodology. So, are ‘science’ and ‘culture’ separable?
In attempting to discuss this question, the relationship between tech-
nology, which has increasingly colonised ‘science’ since World War 2, and 
economics also needs addressing. Before doing so, I need to make my 
position clear: it is evident that the economic strategy of growth is killing 
our planet, and that there is an urgent necessity not simply to opt for sus-
tainable growth but to adopt the path of ungrowth. As the French politi-
cal scientist Jacques Ellul has noted this will require a global cultural, or 
‘civilisational’, revolution in order for humanity to achieve this ambition 
(cf. Ellul 2015).7 
The question of the specificity of culture, or more specifically of cultural 
creation, is also an issue that needs to be addressed in this discussion 
around science and culture. 
From the nineteenth century onwards the colonised world, was in part 
forced and in part ‘chose’ to adopt Western epistemology, a Western 
6 Ellul 2010, 323: “Il fallait au nom de la Science détruire les idées fausses, les religions, 
les traditions culturelles, les mythes, tout cela, produits de l’imagination dans les âges 
obscurs, devait absolument être remplacé par la Lumière de la Science”.
7 This projection towards a radical departure from current beliefs and cognitive attitudes 
echoes the debate on transformational change, as framed in sustainability studies. An use-
ful conceptualisation of transformative versus incremental approaches to sustainability is 
provided in: Hopwood, Bill; Mellor, Mary, O’Brien, Geoff (2005). “Sustainable Development. 
Mapping Different Approaces”. Sustainable Developoment, 13, 38-52.
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originated organisation of knowledge and of culture. Japan chose this 
course. To what extent this was indeed a pragmatic choice, and to what 
extent it was a function of a colonisation of minds is also a question to 
be discussed. 
Over the past twenty years or so there have been attempts to broach 
the dilemma of modernity and identity in the context of the aftermath of 
colonialism. For instance, in the field of Postcolonial studies and tangential 
academic domains, there is a current debate on intellectual decolonisa-
tion; a sort of second-stage decolonisation beyond territorial, physical 
decolonisation. Departing colonialists not only leave behind problematic 
and improbable borders, Western forms of socio-poltical organisation, and 
a proliferation of flags and national armies. By the same token, they also 
leave behind cultural practices and ways of thinking.
If the colonial ‘legacy’ of modernity, in other words postcolonial mo-
dernity, cannot be de-reified, can it be made more homely, be somehow 
‘naturalised’ while its apparent advantages are preserved?8 Addressing 
this question has been the debate focused on so-called ‘alternative moder-
nities’; a debate that has taken place in the Euro-American academy, and 
in the Chinese academy where the idea of a specifically Chinese Modernity 
has been advanced, and posited as a good modernity.9
What is immediately pertinent to my current concern is that in the 
cases of both Japan and China, as in the fully territorially colonised world, 
Western cultural and institutional norms and forms were introduced 
alongside scientific and technological ones. Not only were the natural, 
or ‘exact’, sciences deployed to displace local scientific understanding 
of the world, but the products of cultural practices were also re-shaped 
and forced into foreign disciplinary categories; a simple example would 
be the modern Western forms of narrative: the novel, the short story. 
Chinese cultural practice has thus taken what was once a ‘Western’ path 
for the past century. 
So when the Chinese authorities refuse Western ‘values’ what are we to 
understand, that while the form is Western the content must be Chinese? 
But after a century of ‘modernisation’, of ‘Westernisation’, of globalisa-
tion, what is now Chinese? Moreover, there is nothing new in this schizo-
8 See the writings of the Qinghua-based academic Wang Hui who also presented a paper 
at the XV EAN Workshop (Venice, 14th May 2015). See Wang 2008, 114-40.
9 The alternative modernities position was first posited and discussed in a series of turn-
of-the-century special issues of the journal Public Culture entitled The Millenial Quartet: 
1) Alternative Modernities ed. by Dilip Parameswar Gaonkar, Public Culture, 11(1), 1999; 
2) Globalization, ed. by Arjun Appadurai, Public Culture,12(1), 2000; 3) Millennial Capital-
ism and Neo-Liberal Culture, ed. by Jean and John Comaroff, Public Culture, 12(2), 2000; 
4) Cosmopolitanism, ed. by Carol A. Beckenbridge, Sheldon Pollock, Homi K. Bhabha and 
Dipesh Chakrabarty, Public Culture, 12(3), 2000. For a summary and critique of the latter 
see: Harootunian 1999, 21-9.
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phrenic desire to adopt Western technology to make China strong while 
‘preserving’ an essential Chineseness. It was at the heart of the movement 
that followed the mid-nineteenth-century Opium Wars, a movement which 
sought to strengthen China by adopting foreign methods in military and 
political organisation and in industry, and, as logically follows, in educa-
tion. The strategy has been applied erratically, but surely, ever since. The 
result has been the China of the twenty-first century which is locked into 
a longer moment stretching back a century and a half which we may term 
the dilemma of Chinese modernity. 
As to China’s cultural identity, a century ago it was the identity of an 
élite expressed in a pre-modern language inaccessible to the majority who 
were largely illiterate. Culture was either local, oral and popular, or it was 
élite and shared across Chinese space by a class whose power depended 
upon it.10 The creation of a ‘nation-wide’ or national culture depended on 
the bringing about of a Chinese nation, and the building of that nation 
demanded in turn the creation and instituting of a ‘national’ homogenised 
language and modern culture. It is that new national language that it is 
the business of China’s Confucius Institute network to disseminate beyond 
China’s borders.
There can be no return to ‘Chinese values’. There can be no dereification 
of a century and half of change. A return to ‘authentic’ Chinese culture 
would mean a return to a minority culture practiced by an élite, and to 
local cultures practiced in local languages. National Chinese culture is 
irredeemably modern. However, there can be, and has been, a false ‘re-
turn’ to Chinese values, to a political logic, the overthrow of which Chen 
Duxiu demanded a century ago. Confucian ‘values’, not for the first-time 
in Chinese history, have been redeployed and reinvented to reinforce and 
support totalitarian forms of power both in China and in other Chinese-
speaking states such as Singapore.
There is a central question here regarding cultural practice, and wheth-
er it could and should be subtracted from the set of globalised practices 
that are now common to the whole world. Should the former colonised 
world keep the technology and ‘return’ to an Ur local culture, or even to 
a reinvented one?
In the twentieth-first century, what is known as ‘culture’ is instrumen-
talised to identitarian ends, as has been the case in the past with tragic 
consequences. It is so in China, it is so in Europe. Such instrumentalisa-
tion pertains to a politics founded on invented cultural identities, nation-
alised and even supra-nationalised identities. For instance, the French 
government exploits the French language hoping to maintain and extend 
its influence in the francophone world, and more broadly in the latino-
10 See Johnson, Nathan, Rawski 1985, passim; Rawski 1979, 8-20, 
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phone world. China propagates a myth of an 8,000-year-old homogeneous 
‘national’ culture and attempts to exploit and extend a sinophone sphere 
of influence.
But for a language to be exploited, it needs first to exist, and the 
great revolution that was needed to bring China into line with other na-
tion states was seen to be the invention of a standard modern Chinese 
language. Words were invented, equivalences found, literary catego-
ries remapped to conform with Western epistemology. A new poetry, a 
new idea of the novel were invented, and regional theatrical practices 
replaced with this strange Western drama form where the actors only 
talked, did not sing, and where the audience could not clap, drink tea 
or eat snacks during the performance.11 Let us take the ‘novel’ form as 
an illustration. While Western sinologists have fallen into the habit of 
retrospectively referring to pre-20th-century xiaoshuo 小說 as ‘Chinese 
novels’, Cyril Birch himself advises us that “the category novel as such 
may be inappropriate… prior to the twentieth century”.12 The appear-
ance of the novel in the Western sense was a product of the familiarity 
with foreign novels – including much middle-brow fiction such as the 
adventures Sherlock Holmes and Jules Verne’s science fiction novels – 
translated into the literary language towards the end of the nineteenth-
century. Although short fiction started to be written in the modern 
vernacular in the late ’10s, notably by Lu Xun 魯迅, the first full-length 
novels in the national language only started to appear in the second half 
of the ’20s and in the early ’30s.13
11 Before the twentieth-century there was no word for ‘novel’. The expression xiaoshuo 
小說, literally ‘small talk’, referred to the ‘popular’ narrative, what seemed to be an ‘en-
tertainment’ genre that was held in contempt by the scholar class who, at least overtly, 
preferred the genres of refined prose and poetry; fiction “no doubt belonged to a minor 
tradition rather than the central élite culture of historiography, philosophical prose, and 
lyric verse” see Birch 1977, x.
12 Birch 1977, xi. It was only with the advent of Western epistemology that the terms 
‘novel’ or changpian xiaoshuo 長篇小說 literally ‘long-length fiction’ and ‘short story’ duanpian 
xiaoshuo 短篇小說 ‘short-length fiction’ were coined; there was also the zhongpian xiaoshuo 
中篇小說 ‘middle-length fiction’, often translated into English as ‘novella’, and occasionally 
as ‘novelette’. Types of modern, national-language fiction were thus classified according 
to length.
13 Lu Xun’s short story “Kuangren riji” 狂人日記 was written in April 1918. However, while 
Lu Xun was writing in the vernacular, this was not quite the National Language. Moreover, 
he did not adopt a modern narrative style. For example, Charles Alber sees the 1922 “A Q [
阿Q ]” as “a contemporary parody of the traditional story script”. Not all the conventions are 
there, but some are, and this is the only story that Lu Xun [魯迅] wrote in serial form. Here 
again, however, A Q is the exception, and the wenyan[文言] (literary language) influence on 
Lu Xun’s works seems to predominate. See Semanov 2017, xxii-iii. For the translated stories 
of Lu Xun see Yang, Gladys (1973). Silent China. Selected Writings of Lu Xun. London; Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press.
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Soon China had two cultures, or at least two cultural imaginaries, a new 
modern Westernised culture heralded by the 4 May Movement’s call for 
Science and Democracy and an older culture that was declared obsolete. 
The advent of the Communist regime did not halt this process, rather its 
trenchant dismissal of the old advanced it.
Thus, like so much else that has been learnt and borrowed in modern 
China, the linguistic and cultural practices of today’s China are not sim-
ply leg’s of a table, they are now part of the wood that the table is made 
from. When we start interrogating the integrity of cultural categories, they 
fall apart. As for the spoken language, as we have seen, the new national 
language drew on the former lingua franca of officialdom itself based on 
colloquial language spoken in the northern half of the dynastic territories. 
It was a language known as guanhua 官話, literally ‘official talk’, or what 
in English we call Mandarin.14 The Chinese language promoted by Confu-
cius institutes today is not ‘authentic’ or ‘genuine’ nor is it ‘millenary’ or 
‘eternal’. What is promoted is a recently invented nation-state normalised 
official language. Indeed, the modern standard Chinese language is a 
lingua franca that has failed to represent the linguistic and cultural and 
historical diversity of the space we now call China. Nevertheless, the lan-
guage promoted abroad serves to present China as a homogeneous whole, 
it is as deceptive as the word ‘Chinese’ itself.
China today is as locked into the global technic-economic system as is 
Europe; and it has been so for some considerable time. The notion that 
China’s identity can now be preserved or resuscitated by the promotion 
of an identitarian cultural politics, that even its own intellectuals largely 
regard as sterile, is illusory.
China in the post-Deng era, has integrated fully not only the world 
economy but the whole gamut of the world’s spectacular circus: tennis 
championships, the Shanghai Formula 1 Grand Prix, the Miss World beauty 
competition, and let us not forget its hosting of the 2008 Olympic games.15
In my book Troubadours, Trumpeters, Troubled Makers. Lyricism, Na-
tionalism, and Hybridity in China and Its Others, I analysed at length the 
integration and negotiation of Western cultural and artistic practices in 
twentieth-century China. Even if the epistemology remained Western, there 
14 There is no such things as written Mandarin, a common error of understanding amongst 
foreigners. Nevertheless, written Chinese, increasingly resembles written-down Mandarin 
or standard spoken Chinese. Nanjing Mandarin served “as the dialectal base of the lingua 
franca” from the beginning of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), and “Beijing Mandarin from 
the second half of the nineteenth century onward... There was no attempt at codification or 
standardisation of the lingua franca as a standard form of speoken Chinese for the general 
public. It was not taught at school… The number of people who attained any degree of pro-
ficiency in it was minimal in areas of southern dialects” (Ping Chen 2008, 202-3).
15 In 2007 Zhang Zilin 张梓琳 became the first PRC Miss World, and in 2012 Yu Wenxia 
于文霞 the second.
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were always attempts at adaptation and nuances introduced in the process 
of intertextuality, resulting in a more or less creatively imaginative hybrid-
ity. But, despite the recent campaign against ‘Western values’, China’s cur-
rent participation in these ‘ludo-economic’ spectacular global events reveal 
no attempt at mitigating, modifying or negotiating Western practices and 
institutions, no attempt to sinify or even hybridise. Indeed, China is now 
fully integrated into economic, technological, spectacular global modernity.
If China is now charged with turning the handle of the barrel organ, who 
made it? If I use the metaphor of the barrel-organ it is because it seems to 
best sum up China’s predicament today. China is now at the controls of a 
system that emits a music according to a pre-established programme. It is 
a closed system in which the ‘musician’ produces a programmed melody, 
where the only variable the organ-grinder can introduce is the speed at 
which the handle is turned.
The repetition, the stability, the inevitability of the barrel organ is akin 
to the system which subjugates and dominates us all in the modern world, 
the ‘technological system’. More complex than a simple barrel-organ, the 
system nevertheless, reveals itself through the interdependence of its com-
ponents, through its generalisation and through its acquired stability; the 
system seems so stable, widespread and entrenched that there is no way 
to reverse it.16 The handle carries on being turned and the one now turning 
it is China.
The technological system having now become global and generalised, 
China finds itself responsible for turning the handle for all of us. This is the 
historical logic resulting from 19th- and 20th-century colonialism, from the 
colonisation of China by Western science and the ideology of Versailles, and 
from China’s élite’s embracing of this course as the only means of survival 
and regeneration.
For the past two decades we have been talking of China’s rapid change. 
But what seems to be an acceleration, a speeding-up, in infrastructural 
development over the past twenty years, this ‘rapid change’, is merely a 
result of “normal foreseeable and an almost linear consequence of prior 
mutation”. The concept of ‘rapid change’, as Ellul says, is just a distraction 
(Ellulm 2012, 100).
China’s attachment to the ‘Science’ that has led to the present tech-
nological system dates from its humiliation during the mid-19th-century 
Opium Wars. The sudden consciousness of China’s military technologi-
cal, especially maritime, ‘backwardness’ jolted a part of China’s ruling 
élite to initiate reform initiatives in favour of Westernisation and ‘self-
reinforcement’ 洋務運動，自強運動, efforts renewed by the Reform Move-
16 Jacques Ellul, Le Système technicien, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1977; le Cherche Midi, 
2012, 93.
132 Lee. Fooling the World or Fooling Itself
Proceedings of the XV East Asia Net Research Workshop, 121-142
ment of 1898, and confirmed in the post-Versailles 4 May Movement of 
1919.17 Thus while Deng Xiaoping’s post-1978 reforms reconnected China 
to, and reinforced the logic of, the imitation of the Western technic-
economic model, they did not constitute its starting point. However, the 
national wealth created by the reforms, that were re-launched after the 
1989 Tiananmen massacre, have supplied the conditions of economic 
growth which have allowed the expansion of the technological system. 
Thus, China’s élite’s dream of being part of this system stretches back 
to the 19th century.
From the point, in the ’80s, when China re-boarded the moving train of 
this technological system it was condemned to imitate, repeat and finally 
overtake the West, and to take over the handle of the barrel-organ. How-
ever, this ‘over-taking’ is illusory. The fact that sensational technological 
discoveries will be made in China and no longer in the West is without 
consequence. That Chinese taikonauts will be the first humans to set foot 
on Mars and not American astronauts is unimportant. Both will be a conse-
quence of China turning the handle of a machine invented in, and supplied 
by, the West, a “reasonable and normal consequence” as Ellul would say, 
of ‘what already exists (2012, 100).
More than thirty years ago, Jacques Ellul analysed China’s modern 
political history and the then Chinese authorities’ policies and foresaw 
the technic-economic and political course of the subsequent three dec-
ades thus:
The technical as both model and ideology has borne its first fruits in the 
notable quality of young Chinese scientists and technologists whom we 
host now in the West where they come to hone their skills and find their 
feet… The current [ideological] orientation is in line with reality. But 
it also expresses this reality, that the technical has finally vanquished 
the revolutionary model of Chinese communism. This interpretation 
allows us to avoid a frequent error that has gained momentum over 
the past three years [since 1979]. All the French newspapers talk of 
the ‘liberalization of the regime’. Whereas, I believe that this is a fun-
damental misconception. The commentators who take this position are 
always surprised when we are witness to people who stick up dazibao 
are arrested, suppressions of student or workers’ demonstrations… 
Each time they write of ‘a brake on liberalization’. But it is a nonsense. 
There never was any liberalization and the new political tendency has 
nothing to do with liberty. There is a transition from a system where 
revolutionary ideology held sway over technical efficiency to a system 
17 This historical narrative is one to which pro-government theoreticians gladly adhere. 
See Yu Keping 2012 (http://en.theorychina.org/xsqy_2477/201306/t20130611_270481.
shtml).
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where the desire for technical growth effaces revolutionary ideology. 
The technical at any price and ‘efficiency first’ have nothing to do with 
liberalization.18
Had China-watchers, journalists and academics read Ellul, it might have 
dramatically reduced their need to consume of humble-pie over the subse-
quent period. Of course, a number of appointed, as well as self-appointed, 
China specialists have still not tasted the pie.
However, writing in 1982, Ellul did not, or would not, foresee the sea-
change that was taking place in the global politics and its economic and 
geopolitical. He foresaw China transforming its people into an ‘advanced 
industrial proletariat’ through industrialisation and technology which, 
despite his clarity regarding the absence of political change, he thought 
might lead to a new revolution Ellul whose writings did so much to in-
spire the ecological movement, saw as inevitable China’s being obliged 
to enthusiastically engage in the technological system. Ellul understood 
the dilemma of China, but could not predict its political outcome. Surpris-
ingly, he seemed to almost welcome China’s aggressive participation in 
the system, and he did so seeing the resultant proletariat as constituting 
a revolutionary potential which would oblige the system to change. But 
China’s technological industrialisation has not led to revolution and thus 
to liberty, but rather to a human rights situation that is getting gradually 
worse, and to an increasingly ecologically catastrophic and hazardous 
environment.
Writing in 1996 over a decade later than Ellul, and concerned about 
pollution in China, Castoriadis predicted “ecological catastrophes without 
precedent”. He continued:
And the catastrophe is much swifter than in Western countries. If we 
lift the Third World out of its misery it will lead to the destruction of the 
18 ‘La technique en tant que modèle et en tant qu’idéologie a produit ses premiers fruits 
dans la qualité remarquable des jeunes Chinois scientifiques et techniciens que nous re-
cevons maintenant en Occident où ils viennent se perfectionner et se situer… L’orientation 
actuelle est cohérente à la réalité. Mais elle exprime aussi cette réalité, à savoir que la 
technique a finalement vaincu le modèle révolutionnaire du communisme chinois. Cette 
interprétation nous permet d’éviter une erreur très fréquente qui se développe depuis trois 
ans. Tous les journaux français parlent de la ‘libéralisation du régime’. Or nous pensons 
qu’il s’agit d’une incompréhension de fond. Les observateurs partant avec cette idée sont 
alors tout surpris lorsque qu’on assiste à l’arrestation des gens qui affichent des dazibaos, 
à des répressions de manifestations étudiantes ou ouvrières… Chaque fois on écrit: ‘coup de 
frein à la libéralisation’. Mais c’est un contresens. Il n’y a jamais eu de la libéralisation et la 
nouvelle tendance n’a rien à voir avec la liberté. Il y a passage d’un système où l’idéologie 
révolutionnaire primait le souci d’efficacité technique, à un système où la volonté de crois-
sance technique efface l’idéologie révolutionnaire. La technique à tout prix et ‘l’efficacité 
d’abord” n’ont rien à voir avec la libéralisation” (Ellul 2015, 227).
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Earth. It is to these absurd dilemmas that the pursuit of the capitalist 
path condemns us.19
If, then, in hindsight Jacques Ellul’s optimism over China was misplaced 
and Castoriadis’s later foreboding a more realistic assessment of where 
China was heading, Ellul’s global strategy, one that implies recognizing 
ceilings and fixing limits, nevertheless remains the only “road map of a 
possible future”. The ceilings (pollution, depletion of resources) represent 
the “boundaries which human action (and technology) must set so that 
life remains possible”. That, of course, is just a minimum. For if we are 
interested in creating or recreating a culture it would be necessary to go 
further and fix “limits that constitute the blueprint of a culture”.20
During the EastAsiaNet workshop at which an initial form of this article 
was presented, we had the pleasure of an intervention by Professor Igna-
zio Musu of Ca’ Foscari University entitled ‘Towards a Green Economy”. 
Professor Musu, an economist, has consecrated much of his recent career 
to ecological questions and the issue of sustainability. He has also visited 
China a number of times and encountered at first hand the contradictions 
between state directives aimed at improving environmental conditions 
and the state-driven imperatives focussed on economic growth. Professor 
Musu talked about regulation and limits and the need to constrain growth. 
He talked about bottom-up civil society action being necessary to bring 
that about.21 For that to be possible in China, a revolution in China’s cur-
rent culture, as well as in the rest of the world’s, would need to happen. 
That revolution would depend on a radical reassessment of the role and 
the nature of science and technology in society and human activity. For, 
technology like science itself is not neutral, and China’s espousing of the 
dominant world technic-economic system has brought about repercussions 
that are not simply social and economic, but which have resulted in dev-
astating consequences for the environment and climate of our planet. 
Science is not neutral. The very concept of ‘objectivity’ and ‘neutrality’ 
is part of what, writing in 1961, Castoriadis referred to as the “illusion of 
exact sciences as historical activity outside of history”. He noted that while 
this illusion persists the temptation to transpose ‘techniques’, ‘methods’ 
and ‘categories’ from the natural sciences to the ‘historical sciences’ and 
human activity will exist (Castoriadis 2009, 263-7). 
19 Castoriadis 2013, 621: ‘Et la catastrophe est beaucoup plus rapide que dans les pays 
occidentaux. Si l’on sort le Tiers Monde de sa misère, ce sera pour détruire la Terre. C’est 
à ces dilemmes absurdes que condamne la poursuite de la lancée capitaliste”.
20 Ellul, Le Système, 305 et 305 n. 25.
21 The emergence of civil society in China has been in fact closely tied to environmental-
ism. On the topic, see Zhang, Joy Y.,; Barr, Michael (eds.) (2013). Green Politics in China. 
Environmental Governance and State-Society Relations. London: Pluto Press. 
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Science, Castoriadis reminds us, comes with a history. There is a histo-
ricity to science, the ‘natural sciences’, the ‘exact sciences’ whose ideology 
and place in the imaginary of human society has changed radically over 
the past century and a half. From science as truth in the mid-nineteenth 
century to science as happiness, in the ’20s and ’30s, to science as omnipo-
tence in the post-World War 2 years, to science giving way to technology 
which offers us eternal life (see Ellul 2012, 332-7).
“The current ideology of science is an ideology of salvation”. Not only 
do we see it as the only way forward, we also refuse to see its negative 
aspects. Science is the solution to all humanity’s problems; this is par-
ticularly clear in health and medicine.22 Indeed, for Ellul, it is this ostrich-
like attitude of modern humanity that explains the failure of the ecology 
movement.
The destruction of rain forests to create ‘virtual water’ (an example of 
this is China’s growing food on cleared land in Latin America to export 
back to China), the massive pollution of oceans, the blue-less skies of 
China’s cities, do not move us to act. The public feels an overpowering 
sentiment of powerlessness when faced with gigantic threats, to the extent 
that we refuse to absorb negative information: Leave it to science, it has 
all the answers.
Increasingly studies on China are no longer about just China, they are 
about the world. This reality poses a particular problem to ‘sinologists’ or 
China specialists, since not only that we have created our object of study 
and observation, but for over a hundred years we have watched, and 
watched over, China (re)creating itself as US. And yet as sinologists we 
often do not want to, or are ill-equipped to, question ourselves. But now, 
after 30 years of so-called reforms which have turned China into a pro-
ductivist and consumerist society, thirty years that have seen China driven 
by a need, a thirst for technology and everything else that constitutes the 
technological, we are unable to deny that when we are looking at China 
we are in fact looking at ourselves.
The realities we address today demand an academic capacity urgently 
to dismantle disciplinary and area studies boundaries. Unfortunately, it is 
a capacity that has never been pronounced. What goes for the world, what 
goes for humanity, goes for China too. But China’s authorities propagate 
an image of, and to, China that they also wish to market to the world. That 
image is a dream:
The universe we inhabit is becoming increasingly a dreamed universe, 
since the society of the spectacle is changing gradually into the society 
of the dream. This is brought about by the diffusion of spectacles of all 
22 Ellul 2012, 339: “L’idéologie actuelle de la science est une idéologie du Salut”.
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sorts which we ask the spectator to internalize, but also brought about 
by the maintained dream of a science which immerses us into a world 
as yet unknown and incomprehensible.23
But in the twenty-first century the dreamed universe has not displaced 
what Guy Debord critiqued as the society of the spectacle, the show soci-
ety, a consumer society in which power and politics had been assimilated to 
the strategies of communication, showbiz and advertising hitherto largely 
confined to the market place. Rather what we have witnessed is a conver-
gence. We are now living in that post-convergent moment. To the theory 
of the society of the spectacle must now be added the critique of om-
nipotent science and technology. And whereas Guy Debord described the 
late twentieth-century world, in which the manner of exercising power in 
totalitarian societies (the concentrated spectacle) and in so-called liberal 
democracies (the diffuse spectacle) were converging, as the integrated 
spectacle, we are now faced with a further element which is the dreamed 
universe. 
Spectacular society has not been transcended, it has mutated. The con-
vergence perceived by Debord continues. Ideologies seemed to melt away 
with the twilight of the twentieth century, but in fact re-disguised them-
selves as other dreams. The New World Order of a post-Communist era 
where universal happiness, made possible by technology and paid for by 
capitalism, had dawned. 
The American ideology seemed to have won. But that dream was of short 
duration. It was broken by the awakening of petty, retrograde, xenopho-
bic, nationalist and fundamentalist dreams made possible by yet another 
crisis of capitalism and constructed on the ruins and dregs of the logic of 
a (post)colonial world order.
We now inhabit a world of seemingly different imaginaries and projected 
dreams; dreams as individual and collective projects. But more than ever 
the dreams are articulated and sustained through an assemblage of spec-
tacles which do not seek to hide widespread human misery and planet-wide 
environmental catastrophe, but rather to mediate them by their integra-
tion into the daily show. We are called on to live a dream not of our own 
imagining. It is a dream in which words are no longer needed to stimulate 
the imagination; the images are provided. It is a dream articulated by an 
array of technological gadgets, electronic entertainments, and mediated 
fears and hopes. 
23 Ellul 2012, 343: ‘L’univers dans lequel nous vivons devient de plus en plus rêvé, car 
la société du spectacle se change peu à peu en société du rêve. Ceci par la diffusion des 
spectacles de tous ordres dans lesquels on demande au spectateur de s’intégrer, mais 
aussi par le rêve entretenu d’une science qui nous plonge dans un monde encore ignoré, 
incomprehensible”.
Proceedings of the XV East Asia Net Research Workshop, 121-142
Lee. Fooling the World or Fooling Itself 137
We have entered the moment of the spectacular-oneiric society.
For the Golden Age Spanish dramatist Calderón de la Barca, all of life 
was a dream, and dreams themselves merely dreams (toda la vida es 
sueño, y los sueños, sueños son.), while for his compatriot Goya over a 
century later the sleep of reason produced monsters (El sueño de la razón 
produce monstruos) for, as the Spanish teaches us, to dream is to sleep. 
Out of a cultural metaphor of early modern society, the technic-economic 
system has produced the world as dream, a dream(ed) world. For the 2008 
Beijing Olympics, China coined the slogan:
同一个世界 
同一个梦
The official translation of which was:
One world, 
One dream
China’s President Xi Jinping has declared his presidency to be that of what he 
calls the Chinese dream, 中国梦. China is enmeshed in the logic of the technic-
economic system. Its people are called on to live life as a dream, to invest in 
President Xi’s promise of a ‘China dream,” of a spectacular-oneiric society.
But the reality is that behind the blinding ideology of the technic-eco-
nomic system, a sleep of reason, has produced the monstrous China night-
mare of environmental disaster, and social misery.
*
Was what is now happening to China avoidable? Perhaps, but only if other 
choices had been made sixty, one hundred, one hundred and fifty years 
ago. What we are witness to now, is the product of the postcolonial na-
tionalist road to salvation to which the logic of Versailles gave rise. But 
the inevitability of China’s and Japan’s being enclosed in this logic was 
already embedded in the imaginary of their intellectual élites at the end 
of the nineteenth, and the beginning of the twentieth-century. Embedded 
in Chen Duxiu’s 1919 slogan of Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy, was the 
roadmap to today’s China. Mr Democracy never reared his head, except 
perhaps in a confused way in the ’80s, and Democracy or no, the technic-
economic outcome would have been the same.24 
24 Let us also recall that what happened in Japan and then in China and in the territorially 
colonised world, that is the reorganisation of knowledge, the epistemological revolutions, 
the denigration of local knowledges, of what E.P. Thompson called ‘common sense’, had also 
occurred earlier in the West resulting in the kind of human upheaval, alienation and misery 
we now see in China’s recently urbanised new proletariat.
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China’s failure to realise that half of Chen’s sloganised ambition that 
was ‘Democracy’, is in part explained by the success of the other half, 
‘Science’. Science never needed democracy to flourish. The one was not 
predicated upon the other; the failure of the post-Communist world to 
shed totalitarian ways has demonstrated as much. But while science and 
technology may not need freedom to advance, cultural creativity craves it. 
While China has been capable of imitating the Western technic-economic 
model, its officially sanctioned art and culture has clearly failed to im-
press beyond its borders. Since the beginning of the 20th century hegem-
onic cultural production has favoured and represented the reinvention of 
an industrialised technological power, of the march towards sovereignty 
through the emulation of Western modernity.
We may go so far as to say that the official literature and culture of 
the Communist era has functioned as an instrument of the post-colonial 
poisoned chalice insofar as it has shaped, negotiated and represented 
the post-Versailles ideology which has led to China’s transformation into 
a major agent of the world technic-economic system. But alongside that 
dominant cultural production there has always existed a current that has 
engaged in the critique of that system. And when, as has often been the 
case during most of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, cultural crea-
tivity has been suppressed and censored it has resulted in a critical, dis-
sident cultural discourse, for where there is oppression and censorship, 
there will be resistance and dissent as surely as night follows day.
Rather than imitate and laud the technic-economic system, unofficial 
modern Chinese creativity has drawn on the West’s, and China own, criti-
cal traditions to create alternative cultural modernities of contestation. 
This parallel creativity in poetry, fiction, film and artistic practice is at 
odds with the spectacular-oneiric vision that is the official China dream.
This disjuncture explains why China’s recent cultural diplomatic policy 
initiatives have failed, and why Western and other Asian visions of the 
dreamed universe remain hegemonic. Official American, French, Ger-
man, British, Spanish and other cultural diplomacies are supported by 
alternative spectacular cultural diplomacies of a modern global dream 
represented by Hollywood, Disney, the Cannes Festival, film-stars, sing-
ers and sports stars. These cultures offer an exotic to the consumer 
which often foregrounds the new, the innovative, the culturally vibrant 
and the cosmopolitan. Asian alternative cultural diplomacy has also been 
extremely powerful in this respect: Japanese manga and video games, 
Korean TV series and K-Pop, Indian cinema and Thai cinema are the most 
spectacular examples. 
China has given the world a cultural diplomatic initiative named after 
Confucius, a name that evokes a millenary order, stability and obedience. 
This strategy of promoting an exotic that is backward-looking, out of step 
with today’s technic-cultural realities, and that excludes its most influ-
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ential living artists and creative talent, means not only that the policy is 
ineffectual, it is counter-productive.
The idea that Chinese Modernity can be different if it re-constructs itself 
within an identitarian cultural capsule, if it ‘reserves’ itself a ‘Chinese’ 
cultural space, if it models itself on the supposed Japanese example of a 
supposedly specific form of modernity, is really to misunderstand the na-
ture of the historical processes that have unfolded and to misunderstand 
the reality of the dangers facing humanity. The 2011 disaster at Fukushima 
was not a problem of a specifically Japanese modernity, but of a global 
industrial modernity in which technology has been given the upper hand.
It is as if there were a psycho-social schizophrenia that had gripped 
China’s authorities. On the one hand they invest in and promote a Western 
technic-economic model, while on the other they implement a culturally 
conservative policy aimed at producing a hermetic, cultural and academic 
system to constrain ‘Westernness’ to the technical sphere.
*
Is there a way out of this limit-less system into which nineteenth-century 
and twentieth-century colonialism has led the world? Perhaps, because 
the system is faulty, and within this faultiness lies hope. We see in today’s 
China the imperfections and the misfirings of the system: the high speed 
trains that derail for lack of respect for security provisions, buildings and 
bridges that collapse because built by non-qualified personnel or because 
the concrete has been watered down, cruise ships that capsize because 
warning signs are ignored. There are other obstacles and brakes on the 
system: the inability of institutions to move forward at the same speed, 
and then there is the widespread social contestation of labour. However, 
without China, humanity cannot retreat from the abyss. In large part, it 
falls to China, colonized by, and currently the agent of, the system to cre-
ate a new culture, and to do so by setting ‘willed-for limits’. The unlimited 
is incapable of founding and constituting a new culture, or a person. ‘It is 
by establishing limits that humans institute themselves as human’.25
Without China’s cooperation, even if the rest of the world co-opted for 
the path of ungrowth, the nightmare would continue. The 37 Chinese nu-
clear power reactors in operation, the 20 under construction, and those 
about to start construction, present not only a mortal danger for China’s 
people but for China’s neighbours also.26 
25 “Ce n’est pas l’illimité qui peut en rien fonder et constituer une culture, ni une perr-
sonne… C’est en établissant des limites volontaires que l’homme s’institue homme” (Ellul 
2012, 305 n. 25).
26 See World Nuclear Association’s website http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/country-
profiles/countries-a-f/china–nuclear-power/. I was reminded of our nationalist vision of 
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If China’s people wish to re-route their future, if they wish to live and not 
just survive, then they will have to fix limits. Such a move would constitute 
a response, albeit belated, to the ‘progress’ proffered by the global system: 
imperialism, colonialism, Americanisation, and globalisation.
Such a course is not impossible. Once again, what has occurred in the 
West, will occur, is already occurring, in China: a shift in opinion consist-
ing in “disappointment, fear, and questioning”, a “widespread revolt27 of 
workers against efficiency and the subordination of labour to yield” (Ellul 
2012, 304). In China on a daily basis there are demonstrations and minor 
rebellions against the system, and at the individual level, suicides in the 
face of inhumane working conditions are common. It is at this price that 
China’s and the world’s consumers have been furnished with the electronic 
trinkets and toys that fill their spectacular-oneiric lives. 
However, the rise of consumerist, productivist China has not only re-
vived and prolonged capitalism for a certain period of time, it has also 
permitted the expansion of the technological system it feeds. At the same 
time China’s participation in this system brings nearer the inevitable social 
and environmental crisis that Ellul predicted a quarter-century ago. What 
Ellul three decades ago resonates even louder and truer since China’s 
leadership fully integrated the country into a system on whose super-face 
the cracks are legion.
China’s contribution to the world’s future well-being does not lie in 
re-inventing itself an alternative cultural modernity, nor in marketing a 
cultural sand-castle that crumbles in the fingers, but rather in contributing 
to a global conversation focussed on limits. Only then will the real issues 
facing the world’s present and future populations be frontally addressed. 
Only then will the mystique of growth be interrogated and that creativity, 
poiesis, will reassert its centrality in human society. I use the word crea-
tivity, in the sense used by Castoriadis. Poiesis is the work of the artisan 
and the artist that is not subordinated to the constraints of subsistence. It 
is creation. The artist and the artisan in the post-colonial, post-industrial, 
ungrowth society will inevitably need to resort to a cosmopolitan brico-
lage, creating out of the present and the past, out of what is to hand, and 
out of what may come from afar. This creativity may be imbricated with 
new forms of culture, but it will certainly imply a new poetry, or poiesis, of 
nuclear power and of the illusion of a non-global approach to stepping back from dependence 
on nuclear technology during a 2014 workshop on the Fukushima disaster, when a Japanese 
speaker suggested that Japanese civil society was now willing and ready to push for the 
elimination of nuclear power plants. That is all well and good, but what about the problem 
of Chinese civil society on the other side of the East China Sea not being able to follow suit?
27 The China Labour Bullettin (CLB) provides regularly updated statistics about workers’ 
protests in the country. An interactive strike map can be consulted on CLB website at: 
http://maps.clb.org.hk/strikes/en.
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daily life, the abandonment of the dreamed universe, throwing away the 
barrel-organ handle, and creating a new music. Only then will the sense 
of techne, as the human capacity to make and perform, be restored.
But, if change in the sense of ‘ungrowth’, an abandonment of current 
economic dogma and a restoration of the ecological balance of our en-
vironment is to be effected, then the strategy Ellul proposed in the ’80s 
would need prompt implementation. A new music, a new imaginary, a new 
ideology in the best sense of the term, together with propitious intellectual 
and moral conditions, would be indispensable to the creation of a new hu-
man spirit. Specifically, narrow self-interest would need to be overcome, 
and a commonly borne frugality and ‘revolutionary austerity” instituted. 
All in all, a profound epistemological shake-up, and a shared and global 
awakening from our collective dream would be required. This could only 
be rendered possible by a ‘cultural revolution’ and the institution of ‘an 
ethics of powerlessness’.28 Alluding to the doctrines espoused by Gandhi 
and the civil rights movement, Ellul described the spirit of ‘powerlessness’ 
as going beyond non-violence, as constituting ‘the choice… not to domi-
nate, not to exploit, and even not to use the means of power that could be 
available to us’.29
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